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Those	  against	  immigration	  often	  argue	  that	  “immigration	  is	  bad	  for	  safety”	  or	  “immigration	  means	  
more	  crime”.	  Let	  us	  state	  emphatically:	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  link	  between	  immigration	  and	  crime.	  In	  a	  
recent	  meta-­‐analysis	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  and	  crime	  rates,	  Ousey	  &	  Kubrin	  (1)	  
found	  that	  there	  is	  a	  weak	  negative	  immigration-­‐crime	  association,	  with	  homicide	  being	  the	  most	  
negatively	  significant	  crime	  associated	  with	  immigration.	  Adelmann	  et	  al.	  (2),	  for	  their	  part,	  
investigated	  40	  years	  of	  an	  immigration-­‐crime	  relationship	  in	  metropolitan	  areas	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  
found	  that	  immigration	  is	  consistently	  linked	  to	  decreases	  in	  violent	  and	  property	  crime.	  	  
	  
Opinion	  surveys	  in	  Western	  countries	  suggest	  that	  people	  are	  increasingly	  against	  immigration.	  In	  
the	  UK,	  according	  to	  European	  Social	  Survey	  (ESS)	  data,	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  against	  allowing	  
immigrants	  from	  poorer	  countries	  has	  risen	  from	  around	  15%	  in	  2002	  to	  around	  22%	  in	  2014.	  
However,	  results	  from	  the	  same	  survey	  seem	  to	  confirm	  that	  more	  immigration	  does	  not	  mean	  
more	  crime,	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  declaring	  to	  have	  been	  victim	  of	  burglary	  or	  assault	  in	  the	  
last	  five	  years	  decreased	  from	  around	  28%	  in	  2002	  to	  around	  18%	  in	  2014.	  
	  
In	  Europe,	  starting	  from	  the	  economic	  crisis	  in	  2008,	  a	  seemingly	  unstoppable	  wave	  of	  populism	  
has	  pervaded	  the	  continent.	  According	  to	  electionresources.org,	  parties	  like	  the	  Party	  for	  
Freedom	  (PVV)	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  the	  Five	  Star	  Movement	  (M5S)	  in	  Italy,	  the	  UK	  Independence	  
party	  (UKIP)	  in	  the	  UK	  or	  the	  Alternative	  for	  Germany	  party	  (AFD)	  in	  Germany	  have	  passed	  from	  
one-­‐digit	  preference	  percentages	  in	  pre-­‐2008	  parliamentary	  elections	  to	  two-­‐digit	  figures	  at	  the	  
times	  of	  the	  refugee	  crisis.	  Parties	  like	  the	  Hungarian	  Civic	  Alliance	  (FIDESZ)	  in	  Hungary	  have	  
maintained	  percentages	  close	  to	  50%,	  governing	  with	  semi-­‐xenophobic	  policies	  of	  closures	  against	  
each	  possible	  concession	  to	  immigration,	  often	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  
European	  Union.	  The	  equation	  “more	  immigration	  equals	  more	  crime”	  has	  always	  been	  one	  of	  the	  
favourite	  propagandistic	  slogans	  of	  these	  parties.	  So	  is	  it	  that,	  to	  cite	  a	  recent	  Observer	  quote,	  
populism	  festers	  when	  those	  [populist]	  leaders	  decide	  that	  those	  they	  represent	  are	  too	  stupid	  to	  
grapple	  with	  real-­‐world	  complexity?	  (3)	  
	  
The	  search	  for	  a	  complete	  security	  where	  individuals	  are	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  count	  on	  the	  strength	  
of	  the	  bonds	  of	  community,	  but	  have	  more	  and	  more	  a	  duty	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  themselves	  (4)	  
gives	  rise	  to	  demands	  for	  borders,	  walls,	  and	  scapegoats.	  In	  the	  perception	  of	  many	  European	  
citizens,	  migrants	  are	  representative	  of	  a	  nightmare.	  They	  express	  the	  precariousness	  and	  fragility	  
of	  the	  human	  condition.	  In	  a	  certain	  sense	  they	  represent	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  "superfluous",	  
which	  we	  ourselves,	  because	  of	  increasing	  precarity	  economic,	  could	  easily	  become.	  Immigrants	  
have	  become	  the	  main	  bearers	  of	  what	  the	  domestic	  population	  fears	  and	  against	  which	  it	  draws	  
borders.	  Borders,	  paradoxically,	  simply	  amplify	  the	  very	  differences	  they	  seek	  to	  contain.	  Precisely	  
because	  of	  this,	  borders	  and	  the	  differences	  they	  create	  become	  self-­‐legitimating	  (5).	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  even	  poverty,	  in	  an	  era	  of	  globalization,	  becomes	  strategically	  functional	  to	  the	  
market,	  because	  it	  represents,	  so	  to	  speak,	  the	  living	  proof	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  free	  from	  
uncertainty,	  so	  that	  the	  sight	  of	  the	  poor	  constrains	  the	  non-­‐poor	  from	  imagining	  a	  different	  world	  
(6).	  The	  poor	  are	  often	  criminalized,	  along	  with	  foreigners,	  according	  to	  the	  rites	  of	  the	  scapegoat	  
(7).	  Sociality,	  which	  characterizes	  our	  societies,	  is	  expressed,	  sometimes	  in	  orgies	  of	  compassion	  
and	  charity,	  sometimes	  in	  outbursts	  of	  immense	  aggression	  against	  a	  newly	  discovered	  public	  
enemy	  (6).	  The	  collective	  anxiety,	  in	  waiting	  to	  find	  a	  tangible	  threat	  against	  which	  to	  manifest	  
itself,	  is	  mobilized	  against	  any	  enemy	  and,	  often,	  the	  stranger	  is	  identified	  tout-­‐court	  with	  the	  
criminal	  that	  threatens	  the	  personal	  safety	  of	  citizens.	  Politicians	  tend	  exactly	  to	  exploit	  this	  
hardship	  for	  political	  ends.	  
	  
This	  has	  nowadays	  become	  a	  very	  sensitive	  topic	  and	  extreme	  care	  should	  be	  taken	  when	  
considering	  the	  relation	  of	  populism	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  “immigration	  fear”.	  Official	  opinion	  
surveys	  like	  the	  Eurobarometer,	  or	  the	  ESS,	  seldom	  have	  explicit	  questions	  about	  this	  relationship	  
in	  their	  questionnaires,	  even	  in	  special	  editions.	  With	  these	  surveys	  one	  can	  combine	  similar	  
questions	  (“Are	  you	  against	  immigration?”	  	  “Do	  you	  think	  in	  your	  country	  crime	  is	  increasing?”),	  
and	  obtain	  composite	  indicators	  about	  this	  relationship.	  Private	  survey	  questionnaires	  might	  have	  
questions	  on	  this,	  but	  then	  one	  cannot	  entirely	  rely	  on	  their	  estimates,	  as	  incomplete	  information	  
is	  provided	  on	  technical	  aspects	  of	  the	  surveys.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  cannot	  completely	  rely	  on	  
surveys	  about	  the	  relationship	  immigration-­‐insecurity.	  Moreover,	  in	  responding	  to	  sensitive	  topics	  
people	  tend	  to	  hide	  their	  real	  feelings.	  Answers	  given	  to	  objective	  questions	  are	  often	  in	  
contradiction	  with	  respect	  to	  answers	  to	  perception/opinion	  questions	  relating	  to	  the	  same	  topic.	  
	  
We	  have	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  multiple	  sources	  of	  information	  about	  this	  relationship,	  giving	  
them	  a	  different	  weight,	  according	  to	  their	  reliability,	  and	  end	  up	  with	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  the	  
estimates.	  This	  is	  sometimes	  called	  “blended”	  or	  “combined”	  estimation,	  and	  in	  this	  era	  of	  a	  big	  
data	  revolution	  includes	  also	  considering	  complementary	  data	  sources	  and	  social	  networks	  like	  
Twitter.	  Twitter	  estimates	  can	  be	  obtained	  using	  text	  mining	  techniques.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
immigration-­‐crime	  relationship,	  automatic	  classification	  of	  tweets	  between	  favourable	  and	  
unfavourable	  should	  be	  accompanied	  by	  manual	  evaluation	  when	  neutral	  tweets	  are	  retrieved	  or	  
there	  is	  training	  of	  the	  automatic	  coder	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  false	  positive	  responses	  (8).	  Then,	  
Bayesian	  analysis	  can	  be	  used	  to	  directly	  model	  the	  bias	  contained	  in	  each	  estimate	  source	  with	  
the	  subjective	  evaluation	  of	  the	  researcher	  between	  more	  and	  less	  reliable	  estimates	  (for	  details	  
on	  these	  methods	  see	  (9)).	  	  
Preliminary	  results	  conducted	  by	  the	  authors	  using	  this	  methodology	  shows	  that	  “official”	  surveys	  
tend	  to	  give	  generally	  less	  unfavourable	  attitudes	  about	  the	  immigration-­‐crime	  relationship.	  On	  
the	  other	  side,	  Twitter	  and	  private	  survey	  estimates	  present	  the	  most	  unfavourable	  results.	  	  
ESS	  2014	  data	  were	  used	  to	  obtain	  an	  index	  of	  the	  perceived	  immigration-­‐insecurity	  association	  
(PII	  index)	  by	  combining	  a	  perceived	  safety	  index	  constructed	  with	  the	  responses	  to	  two	  questions	  
in	  the	  ESS	  2014	  questionnaire	  regarding	  the	  victimization	  with	  respect	  burglary/assault	  in	  the	  last	  
5	  years	  and	  the	  feeling	  about	  walking	  alone	  in	  area	  of	  residence	  after	  dark,	  and	  an	  index	  of	  the	  
attitude	  towards	  migrants	  constructed	  from	  6	  questions	  in	  the	  questionnaire	  (“Should	  your	  
country	  allow	  people	  from	  abroad	  to	  come	  and	  live	  here?”,	  “Would	  you	  say	  it	  is	  generally	  bad	  or	  
good	  for	  your	  country’s	  economy	  that	  people	  come	  and	  live	  here	  from	  other	  countries?”,	  etc.).	  	  
The	  ESS	  2014	  PII	  index	  resulted	  34.2%	  for	  Spain,	  39.9%	  for	  France,	  36.5%	  for	  the	  UK	  and	  38.8%	  for	  
Italy.	  Ipsos	  2014	  data	  were	  used	  to	  construct	  the	  PII	  index	  by	  considering	  the	  responses	  to	  two	  
questions	  very	  related	  to	  the	  II	  relationship,	  i.e.	  “Would	  you	  say	  that	  immigration	  has	  generally	  
had	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  impact	  on	  your	  country?,	  and	  “Immigration	  is	  causing	  my	  country	  to	  
change	  in	  ways	  that	  I	  don’t	  like”,	  and	  	  taking	  a	  simple	  average	  of	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  
unfavourable	  answers.	  The	  Ipsos	  2014	  PII	  index	  resulted	  60.0%	  for	  Spain,	  71.0%	  for	  France,	  60.5%	  
for	  the	  UK	  and	  77.0%	  for	  Italy.	  Finally,	  for	  each	  of	  the	  four	  countries	  1,000	  tweets	  regarding	  the	  
immigration-­‐insecurity	  relationship	  were	  analysed	  and	  classified	  in	  “good”	  or	  “bad”	  tweets	  and	  
the	  proportion	  of	  the	  bad	  tweets	  were	  regarded	  as	  the	  Twitter	  2014	  PII	  index,	  which	  resulted	  
59.4%	  for	  Spain,	  60.7%	  for	  France,	  60.5%	  for	  the	  UK	  and	  75.3%	  for	  Italy.	  	  
	  
The	  Bayesian	  analysis	  combines	  these	  estimates	  and	  gives	  estimates,	  which	  are	  more	  or	  less	  close	  
to	  the	  original	  estimates	  according	  to	  the	  belief	  about	  the	  bias	  in	  the	  original	  sources.	  For	  
example,	  if	  one	  believes	  that	  45%	  is	  the	  true	  PII	  index	  (therefore	  believing	  that	  ESS	  is	  the	  less	  
biased	  source	  as	  it	  gives	  estimates	  closer	  to	  this	  value),	  then	  the	  combined	  PII	  index	  will	  result	  
36.9%	  for	  Spain,	  49.0%	  for	  France,	  38.4%	  for	  the	  UK	  and	  51.1%	  for	  Italy.	  The	  true	  hypothesized	  
estimate	  included	  exogenously	  in	  the	  model	  can	  be	  taken	  from	  a	  previous	  census	  or	  a	  more	  
reliable	  source.	  Other	  sources	  like	  Eurobarometer	  can	  be	  added	  in	  the	  model.	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  here	  we	  face	  the	  well-­‐known	  "folk	  devils"	  phenomenon	  mentioned	  by	  Cohen	  (10),	  
i.e.	  subjects	  considered	  to	  be	  enemies	  of	  public	  order,	  identified	  in	  figures	  like	  homeless	  people,	  
vagabonds,	  prostitutes	  or	  migrants	  who	  represent	  the	  source	  of	  moral	  panic	  skilfully	  nurtured	  by	  
the	  media	  and	  populist	  parties	  (11).	  
However,	  people	  react	  differently	  responding	  to	  an	  official	  survey	  questionnaire	  or	  tweeting	  
spontaneously.	  In	  the	  first	  case	  they	  still	  shows	  self-­‐control,	  whereas	  in	  the	  second	  case	  they	  tend	  
to	  remove	  their	  inhibitory	  brakes.	  
	  
With	  sensitive	  topics	  like	  the	  immigration-­‐insecurity	  relationship	  one	  cannot	  rely	  on	  one	  source	  of	  
information	  only.	  Bayesian	  analysis	  allows	  for	  considering	  multiple	  source	  of	  information	  and	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